Grekët e sotëm

Grekët (gr. Έλληνες) janë një komb modern qe sot jeton në Greqi, Qipron (në pjesën e jugut), rajone të tjera dhe para vitit 1923 edhe në Anadoll. Ata gjithashtu formojnë një diasporë të konsiderueshme, me komunitetet ortodokse greqishtfolëse të vendosura në mbarë botën. Ky komb modern është i njohur në shqip edhe me disa emra të tjerë si gërqishtarë ose junanë (turqisht Yunanlar).^[1]

Deri në fillim të shekullit të 20-të, greqishtfolësitit ishin të shpërndarë në mënyrë uniforme midis gadishullit grek, në brigjet perëndimore të Azisë së Vogël, në Pont, Egjipt, Qipro dhe Traki (Stamboll); shumë prej këtyre rajoneve përkojnë në një masë të madhe me kufijtë e Perandorisë Bizantine të shekullit të 11-të dhe zonat e Mesdheut Lindor të kolonizuara në periudhën e Greqisë së Lashtë.^[2] Si rrjedhojë e luftës greko-turke në periudhën 1919-1922, një shkallë të madhe të këmbimit të popullsisë midis Greqisë dhe Turqisë u zhvillua që transferua ortodoksët greqishtfolës dhe ortodoksët turqishtfolës (konsideruar si "grekët") të krishterë etnikë, në mënyrë efektive, dhe u vendosën në kufijtë e shtetit modern grek dhe Qipron. Popullatat e tjera historike etnike greqishtfolësit mund të gjendet në jug të Italisë deri në Kaukaz dhe në komunitetet e diasporës në një numër të vendeve të tjera. Sot, shumica e ortodoksët greqishtfolësit janë të regjistruar zyrtarisht si anëtarë të Kishës Ortodokse Greke.^[3]

Ortodoksët greqishtfolës kanë ndikuar në masë të madhe dhe kanë kontribuar për kulturën, artet, eksplorim, letërsinë, filozofinë, politikën, arkitekturën, muzikën, matematikën, shkencën, teknologjinë, kuzhinën, dhe sportet, jashtë vendit dhe në mbarë botën.

Ortodoksët greqishtfolëse flasin gjuhën greke, e cila formon degën e saj unik brenda familjes gjuhëve indo-evropiane.

Në kohët e lashta, rajoni i quajtur Greqia asnjëherë nuk ishte i bashkuar deri në pushtimin romak brenda një njësie të vetme.^[4] Panhelenizmi dhe luftërat kundër Persisë nuk kishin më të bënin me një komb grek të bashkuar sesa koalicioni anti-maqedonas.^[4] Përfundimi ishte se helenët (greqishtfolës të lashtë) kishin një kuptim të dobët ose joefektiv kombëtar.^[4]

Shumica e zonës që përfshin Greqinë moderne u pushtuan dhe u kolonizuan nga sllavët që vinin nga Europa verilindore në fund të shekullit gjashtë pas Krishtit.^[6] Zona e Greqisë qendrore dhe pjesa më e madhe e gadishullit, me përjashtim të disa qyteteve të mëdha ishin jashtë kontrollit të Perandorisë Bizantine.^[6] Vetëm pas luftërave në fund tëm shekullit tetë, Perandoria Bizantine rimori shumicën e këtyre rajoneve.^[6] Historianët grekë nacionalistë pohojnë se sllavofolësit dhe fshatrat e tyre u zhdukën nga periudha e hershme mesjetare dhe se ata shkuan përsëri prap në atdheun e tyre ose u mposhtën nga popullata e madhe greke.^[6] Studiuesit bashkëkohorë si arkeologët kanë një kronologji të ndryshme ngjarjesh.^[6] Sllavët u vendosën në vendbanimet të vjetra dhe më vonë u bashkuan me popullatat vendore greqishtfolës që mbetën dhe formuan komunitete të përziera Helleno-Sllave.^[6] Procesi u përforcua nga konvertimi i sllavëve në ortodoksinë në shumicën e Ballkanit dhe më gjerë, gjatë kësaj periudhe të njëjtë.^[6] Nga shekullin nëntë, perandoria bizantine që ishte ortodokse e greqishtfolës u rigjallërua dhe privilegjonte gjuhën e kulturën greke, dhe sidomos në gadishullin grek nuk inkurajonte që etniteti vendor të lulëzonte.^[6] Kështu, heleno-sllavët u bënë thjesht "ortodoksë dhe/ose grekë" nga klasifikimi tatimor i perandorisë osmane të grupeve etnike nga shekullit pesëmbëdhjetë në Greqi.^[6]

Njerëzit greqishtfolës në epokën mesjetare e quanin veten "romioi", domëthënë romak, për të treguar pretendimin bizantine për vazhdimësinë me Perandorinë Romake Lindore - dhe kështu ishin pjesë e komuniteteve të quajtura "Rum" nga osmanët.^[7]

Pas pavarësisë së Greqisë nga Perandoria Osmane, grekët e kohës dhe dekadat e mëvonshme rinovuan kombin e tyre me premisën se ata ishin, në kuptim të gjuhës dhe kulturës, pasardhësit e helenëve të lashtë dhe se ka pasur një vazhdimësi gjuha dhe kultura greke që nga antikiteti në vendet historike greke; "e cila ngriti në atë kohë dhe ende ngre shumë vetullat në Perëndim, si dhe në Lindje".^[8] Në fund të shekullit të nëntëmbëdhjetë, miti kombëtar grek u vendos në një linjë të drejtpërdrejtë të prejardhjes që lidh shtetin bashkëkohor grek me heronjtë e mitologjisë helene, antikitetit klasik, periudhës helenistike, transformimit të Perandorisë Romake Lindore në Perandorinë Bizantin dhe "periudha e shtypjes" nën Perandorinë Osmane.^[9] Ky mit themelor kombëtar ka qenë i suksesshëm në bindjen e pasardhësve të grupeve jo greqishtfolës, jo më pak se ato greqishtfolës në vendet historike greke, se pretendimi i tyre për prejardhje kulturore nga helenët nuk ishte vetëm i pakundërshtueshëm; ajo ka provuar një forcë ngjitëse të fuqishme, e cila mbajti kombin së bashku dhe ka prodhuar arritje të konsiderueshme kulturore në hapësirën e më pak se dy shekujsh.^[8]

Në kohët e lashta kuptimi dhe përdorimi i termit Evropa ishte tepër i parëndësishëm për helenët e lashtë, dhe për persët për këtë çështje dhe se nëse ekzistonte ndonjë lloj referimi për Evropën, ajo ishte e përqendruar shumë më tepër në lindje se sa është sot.^[10] Pjesa më e madhe e lidhjes midis Greqisë antike dhe Evropës në kohët moderne është vepra e intelektualëve 'evropianë' moderne që nga Iluminizmi, kur lidhja u rindërtua nëpërmjet referencave për qytetërimin e lashtë grek. Helenizmi i Greqisë moderne u imponua në masë të madhe nga evropianët perëndimorë, ndërsa Greqia moderne kishte më shumë të bënte me Orientin kulturalisht dhe politikisht.^[10] Megjithatë, ndërtimi i lidhjes midis Greqisë së lashtë dhe Evropës tani ka shërbyer si një legjitimim i mitit për interpretimin eurocentrik të qytetërimit evropian si unik dhe universal në të njëjtën mënyrë që grekët e lashtë besonin se kultura dhe qytetërimi i tyre ishte unik dhe superior ndaj të gjithë të tjerët.^[10]

Nga fundi i shekullit të nëntëmbëdhjetë, fëmijët e banorëve të shtetit të ri kombëtar u mësuan në greqisht, historia u kufizua vetëm në episodet e greqisë së pastër dhe qëndrimi tolerant osman në shumëllojshmërinë kulturore i dha një politikë të qëllimshme të helenizmit total e popullsisë - "aq efektive për të mashtruar vëzhguesin e rastësishëm".^[11] Gjuhët jo-greke arritën të mbijetonin gjatë shekullit njëzetë në komunitete që u bënë dygjuhësore si Arbëreshët të Greqisë (Arvanitët) për shkak të provincialitetit dhe faktorëve të tjerë si analfabetizmi.^[11]

Shkencat e kohëve të fundit ka theksuar se si Perëndimi e ndërtoi Greqinë e sotëm në imazhin e vet të çuditshëm, si toka e një populli të gjatë, të cilët ishin pasardhës të drejtpërdrejtë të Perikliut.^[12] Kjo krijim perëndimor i "historisë së lavdishme të vazhdueshme të popullit grek" është epitomizuar në botimin e enciklopedive popullore me shumë vëllime si "Historia e kombit grek" dhe shënuar me reagime histerike ndaj kërcënimit të supozuar të paraqitur nga Republika e Maqedonisë - jo vetëm thjesht duke e përvetësuar emrin "Maqedoni".^[12] Duke u ngatërruar me një statut të tillë të themelimit që nga vitet e hershme të pavarësisë, ka detyruar sistemin arsimor grek dhe propagandën shtetërore të përqendrojë mbijetesën e kombit të ri në vështirësi mbi atë që shkencari Benedict Anderson e ka quajtur "komunitetin e imagjinuar" të grekëve.^[12]

Enti kombëtar, i përcaktuar nëpërmjet përdorimit alternativ të termeve 'Helenizmi', 'populli Grek' ose 'Grekët' dhe 'Greqia', konsiderohet të jetë si "fakt" jashtë kontekstit të historisë dhe gjeografisë.^[13] Përdorimi i termit Helenizmi ndihmon tregimet historike për të shmangur anakronizmat dhe kontradiktat e dukshme, ndërkohë që indirekt paraqesin kombin grek si të përhershëm.^[13] Ky subjekt i përjetshëm dhe antropomorf është duke kapërcyer si gjeografinë, ashtu edhe historinë, pasi ajo përdoret për të përkufizuar grekët nga kohët minoane deri në shekullin e tetëmbëdhjetë. Kështu shërben si bazë për vlerësimin e ngjarjeve, akteve dhe kulturave me kalimin e kohës.^[13]

Sistemi kombëtar grek i arsimit thekson trashëgiminë e Athinës klasike dhe vazhdimësinë e virtyteve greke.^[14] Historia dhe arkeologjia për grekët sot zakonisht janë të gjitha, por ndalen në Epokën e Aleksandrit, dhe i pari vetëm fillon përsëri me Luftën e Pavarësisë në fillim të shekullit nëntëmbëdhjetë.^[14] Gjatë ndërhyrjes së dy mijëvjeçarëve të "shtypjes, shpirti grek dremiti në zinxhirë, me vetëm kisha dhe ikona bizantine për të shënuar flakën e përjetshme".^[14]

Feja është pjesë e rëndësishme e identitetit për shumicën të grekëve, me 76 përqind e grekëve në një sondazh 2015-17 thanë se kombësia e tyre është përcaktuar nga krishterimi, pas Armenisë (82 përqind), Gjeorgjisë (81 përqind) dhe Serbisë (78 përqind).^[15] 92 përqind e grekëve besojnë në ekzistencën e Zotit, përpara rusëve (75 përqind).^[15] Greqia dhe Letonia kishin normën më të lartë të atyre që besojnë në "syrin e keq", secili me 66 përqind.^[15] Greqia renditet e para (89 përqind) në për perceptimin e superioritetit kulturor mbi njerëzit e tjerë, përpara Armenisë (84 përqind) dhe Rusisë (69 përqind).^[15] Vetëm 31 përqind e grekëve do të pranonin një musliman si anëtar të familjes së tyre, ndërsa 35 përqind do të pranonin një hebre.^[15]

Imazhi e shqiptarëve në ideologjisë popullore greke është ende një shëmbëlltyrë e errët dhe mendimet ekzistojnë në mesin e popullatës greke se shqiptarët nuk kanë vend dhe asnjë popull.^[16] Grekët radikal irredentistë mendojnë se shqiptarët vetëm vjedhin dhe plaçkitin trashëgiminë kulturore të popujve të tjerë dhe se kurrë nuk kanë përbërë një unitet kombëtar-racor, dhe janë pasardhësit të grekëve (70%), sllavo-turqit (20%) dhe disa fiset franke (10%).^[16]

Referime

^ Friedman, Victor A. (1997), "One Grammar, Three Lexicons: Ideological Overtones and Underpinnings in the Balkan Sprachbund Arkivuar 27 prill 2012 tek Wayback Machine", Papers from the 33rd Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (PDF), Chicago Linguistic Society. f. 33. "At first glance, the Greek practice of referring to Macedonian and Bulgarian speakers living in the Greek state as slavoophone Greeks, or to Albanian speakers as albanophone Greeks might appear to be a way of combining a recognition of linguistic difference with the old millet system of ethnic identification or possibly even the newer concept of nation-state citizenship (Greek thus meaning 'Greek Orthodox Christian' or, conceivably, 'Greek citizen'). That this is not actually the case, however, and that this policy is aimed at assimilating non-hellenophone minorities is seen in the fact that, aside from the history of oppressive government policies that have never allowed the use of the languages of non-hellenophone Christians in any public sphere and have, during some periods, even gone as far as to prohibit these languages in private, Greek governments never refer to the Greek-speaking minority of southern Albania as hellenophone Albanians or to Greek speakers in Turkey (regardless of religion) as hellenophone Turks."
^ Beaton, R. (1996). The Medieval Greek Romance. Routledge. fq. 1–25. ISBN 0-415-12032-2. {{cite book}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)
^ CIA World Factbook on Greece: Greek Orthodox 98%, Greek Muslim 1.3%, other 0.7%.
^ ^a ^b ^c Walbank, Frank W. (2010). Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography. Cambridge University Press. f. 1-3. "Can we speak of a Greek nation? Greece, as we all know, was never united until the Roman conquest within a single entity; consequently there can be no history of Greece in the sense that there is a history of Rome. But the concept of a Greek nation trying to realise itself (and failing) has been adopted by many historians as the most fruitful criterion for interpreting the kaleidoscopic relations of the Greek cities.... 'Particularism', we read, 'was the hereditary curse of the Greek people.' Athens, Sparta, Macedon, and the third-century Confederations, with their 'republican movement', were the successive incarnations of this spirit of national unity striving to be born. Each in turn proved abortive.... But the other supposedly great moment of Greek unification - the setting up of the League of Corinth by Philip II after Chaeronea - very soon became the centre of polemic. For in proportion as the stock of Philip and Isocrates rose, the reputation of Demosthenes fell, until he began to look like a petty and narrow patriot.... For the urge towards the autonomy of the polis was a force working against, and not in the direction of, Hellenic unity; and in an acute and pessimistic study Ferrabino demonstrated that this liberty, admitting no restraint, and developing whenever circumstances allowed into domination over others, was the one really potent factor in Greek history.... Panhellenism and the crusade against Persia.... had no more to do with a united Greek nation than had the anti-Macedonian coalition.... The conclusion seemed to be that the Greeks had a weak or ineffective national sense...."
^ "Companion website for "A genetic atlas of human admixture history", Hellenthal et al, Science (2014)". A genetic atlas of human admixture history. {{cite web}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)
Hellenthal, Garrett; Busby, George B.J.; Band, Gavin; Wilson, James F.; Capelli, Cristian; Falush, Daniel; Myers, Simon (14 shkurt 2014). "A Genetic Atlas of Human Admixture History". Science. 343 (6172): 747–751. Bibcode:2014Sci...343..747H. doi:10.1126/science.1243518. ISSN 0036-8075. PMC 4209567. PMID 24531965. {{cite journal}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)
Hellenthal, G.; Busby, G. B.; Band, G.; Wilson, J. F.; Capelli, C.; Falush, D.; Myers, S. (2014). "Supplementary Material for "A genetic atlas of human admixture history"". Science. 343 (6172): 747–751. doi:10.1126/science.1243518. PMC 4209567. PMID 24531965. S7.6 "East Europe": The difference between the 'East Europe I' and 'East Europe II' analyses is that the latter analysis included the Polish as a potential donor population. The Polish were included in this analysis to reflect a Slavic language speaking source group." "We speculate that the second event seen in our six Eastern Europe populations between northern European and southern European ancestral sources may correspond to the expansion of Slavic language speaking groups (commonly referred to as the Slavic expansion) across this region at a similar time, perhaps related to displacement caused by the Eurasian steppe invaders (38; 58). Under this scenario, the northerly source in the second event might represent DNA from Slavic-speaking migrants (sampled Slavic-speaking groups are excluded from being donors in the EastEurope I analysis). To test consistency with this, we repainted these populations adding the Polish as a single Slavic-speaking donor group ("East Europe II" analysis; see Note S7.6) and, in doing so, they largely replaced the original North European component (Figure S21), although we note that two nearby populations, Belarus and Lithuania, are equally often inferred as sources in our original analysis (Table S12). Outside these six populations, an admixture event at the same time (910CE, 95% CI:720-1140CE) is seen in the southerly neighboring Greeks, between sources represented by multiple neighboring Mediterranean peoples (63%) and the Polish (37%), suggesting a strong and early impact of the Slavic expansions in Greece, a subject of recent debate (37). These shared signals we find across East European groups could explain a recent observation of an excess of IBD sharing among similar groups, including Greece, that was dated to a wide range between 1,000 and 2,000 years ago (37) {{cite journal}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ Bintliff, John (2003). "The Ethnoarchaeology of a “Passive” Ethnicity: The Arvanites of Central Greece Arkivuar 8 mars 2019 tek Wayback Machine". në K.S. Brown & Yannis Hamilakis, (eds.). The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories. Lexington Books. f. 141-142. Yet we should not forget that, in the late sixth century AD, the whole of the area comprising modern Greece was overrun and colonized by Slays emanating from northeast Europe (Malingkoudis 1991). Central Greece, as most regions of the peninsula—the largest towns apart—was lost to the young Byzantine Empire, and it was only after recurrent campaigns in the late eighth century that Constantinople regained control over the mainland Greek countryside. What happened to the Slav settlers? Some nationalistic Greek historians, noting the disappearance of Slav Speakers and “Slav villages” in Byzantine historical sources for southern Greece by high medieval times, argue that the Slays died out, went home again, or at the very least were submerged definitively beneath the burgeoning Greek ethnic population. Many researchers today are converging on a very different story. The earlier Byzantine-era villages (ca. seventh to tenth centuries AD) that we know of seem to be frequently on or near former Greco-Roman small towns and villages, or large estate centers. Since we know that a major settlement of Slav incomers is included in this settlement picture, it seems most likely that the Slays settled places of earlier settlement and probably merged with surviving local farming populations of Greek descent to form mixed Helleno-Slav communities. The process was enhanced by the conversion of the Slavs to Orthodoxy throughout most of the Balkans and beyond, during this same period. Yet what happened to the language of these Slavs? Let us recall our comments earlier on Christian empires: the resurgent Byzantine, Orthodox, Greek- speaking empire, from the ninth century AD, privileged Greek language and culture, and, especially in the Greek peninsula, did not encourage local ethnicity to flourish. Thus the Helleno-Slavs became the merely “Orthodox and/or Greek” by the fifteenth-century Ottoman tax classification of ethnic groups in Greece."
^ Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 133. "The Greek-speakers would have called themselves, ironically, “Romioi” or “Romans” to signify the Byzantine claim to continuity with the Eastern Roman Empire—and hence were part of the communities called “Rum” by the Ottomans".
^ ^a ^b Koliopoulos, John S. & Veremis, Thanos M. (2009). Modern Greece: A History since 1821. John Wiley & Sons. f. 22-23. "The Greeks of the time and subsequent decades renovated their nation on the premise that they were, in terms, of language and culture, the descendants of the ancient Greeks and that there has been a continuity of the Greek language and culture since antiquity in the historical Greek lands; which raised at the time and still raises many eyebrows in the West as well as in the East." f.23. "Indeed, this founding national myth has been successful in convincing the descendants of the non Greek-speaking groups, no less than Greek-speaking ones of the historical Greek lands, that their claim to cultural descent from the Greeks was not only irrefutable; it has proved a powerful adhesive force, which held the nation together, and has produced substantial cultural achievements in the space of less than two centuries."
^ Blaschke, Jochen (2005). Nation-state Building Processes and Cultural Diversity. Edition Parabolis. f. 201-202. "As a result, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Greek national myth settled on a direct line of ancestry linking the contemporary Greek nation-state with the heroes of Greek mythology, classical antiquity, the Hellenistic period, the transformation of the Eastern Roman Empire to the Byzantine Empire and the period of oppression under the Ottoman Empire."
^ ^a ^b ^c Triandafyllidou, Anna & Gropas, Ruby (2015). What is Europe?^{[lidhje e vdekur]}. Macmillan International Higher Education. f. 28-29. "Reconsidering the meaning and uses of the term Europe in ancient times suggests that Europe was rather unimportant for the ancient Greeks, and for the Persians for that matter, and that if any sort of reference to Europe existed, it was centred much more to the east than it is today. Much of the connection between ancient Greece and Europe in modern times appears to be the work of modern ‘European’ intellectuals since the Enlightenment, when the link was reconstructed through references to ancient Greek civilization. As Tsoukalas also argues (2002) the Hellenism of modern Greece was largely imposed on it by Western Europeans while modern Greece had more to do with the Orient culturally and politically. The construction, however, of the link between ancient Greece and Europe has now served as a legitimizing myth for the Eurocentric interpretation of European civilization as unique and universal in the same way that ancient Greeks believed that their own culture and civilization was unique and superior to all others."
^ ^a ^b Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 138. "Thus from the late nineteenth century onward the children of the inhabitants of the new “nation-state” were taught in Greek, history confined itself to the episodes of pure Greekness, and the tolerant Ottoman attitude to cultural diversity yielded to a deliberate policy of total Hellenization of the populace—effective enough to fool the casual observer. One is rather amazed at the persistence today of such dual-speaking populations in much of the Albanian colonization zone. However, apart from the provinciality of this essentially agricultural province, a high rate of illiteracy until well into this century has also helped to preserve Arvanitika in the Boeotian villagers (Meijs 1993)."
^ ^a ^b ^c Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 138. "In fact, recent scholarship has underlined how far it was the West that built modem Greece in its own fanciful image as the land of a long-oppressed people who were the direct descendants of Pericles. This Western creation of “the glorious continuing story of the Greek People” has been epitomized recently in the publication of multi-volume popular encyclopedias such as “The History of the Greek Nation” and marked even more recently by hysterical reactions to the supposed threat posed by the Slav Republic of Macedonia—not least merely by appropriating the name “Macedonia.” Being saddled with such a foundation charter from the early years of independence has forced the Greek education system and state propaganda to focus the survival of the struggling young nation onto what Benedict Anderson (1991) has termed the “imagined community” of Greeks."
^ ^a ^b ^c Dragonas, Thalia & Birtek, Faruk (2004). Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey. Routledge. f. 178-179. "The national entity, defined through the alternative use of the terms 'Hellenism', 'the Greek people' or 'the Greeks' and 'Greece', is considered as given outside the context of history and of geography. The use of the term Hellenism helps the historical narrative to avoid obvious anachronisms and contradictions, while indirectly presenting the Greek nation as everlasting. This a-temporal and anthropomorphic subject is transcending both geography and history, since it is used to define the Greeks from the Minoan times all the way through to the eighteenth century. It thus serves as a basis for the valorization of events, acts and cultures over time."
^ ^a ^b ^c Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 137. "The Greek national education system stresses the heritage of classical Athens and the continuity of Greek virtues. History and archaeology for Greeks today usually all but stop at the Age of Alexander, and the former only picks up again with the War of Independence in the early nineteenth century. During the intervening two millennia of “oppression,” the Greek spirit slumbered in chains, with only Byzantine churches and icons to mark the eternal flame. The Albanian Greeks are a people without a formal history and no acknowledged place in the Modern Greek state."
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e "Religion is key part of identity for most Greeks" (në anglisht). Kathimerini. Marrë më 2019-05-29. "More specifically, 76 percent of Greeks said that their nationality is defined by Christianity, behind Armenia (82 percent), Georgia (81 percent) and Serbia (78 percent).... A staggering 92 percent of Greek believe in the existence of God, ahead of the Russians (75 percent).... Greece and Latvia had the highest rate of those that believe in the “evil eye,” with each on 66 percent.... Another divide between East and West pertained to perception of cultural superiority over others, with Greece ranking first (89 percent), ahead of Armenia (84 percent) and Russia (69 percent).... Furthermore, only 31 percent Greeks would accept a Muslim as a member of their family while 35 percent would accept a Jew."
^ ^a ^b Hart, Laurie Kain (1999). "Culture, Civilization, and Demarcation at the Northwest Borders of Greece". American Ethnologist. 26. (1): 197. "The Albanian of Greek popular ideology is still a shadowy figure. When the Albanian national football team played a match against its Greek counterpart in Athens in 1990, the Athenian fans chanted: "You don't have a country [homeland]/You don't have a people/ What are you doing here/On this playing field?" [Dhen ekhete patridha/ Dhen ekhete lao/Ti irthate na kanete/Sto yipedho afto?]. The message is not hard to grasp. Having no place and no people, the Albanians cannot constitute a national team; if theirs is not a national team, it cannot have any place on the national playing field. Radical irredentist Greeks put the matter unambiguously: Stealing and plundering the cultural heritage of other peoples [Albanians] should understand that there is no question of their securing a uniform national-racial [ethnofiletiki] identity, because they have never constituted a national-racial unity. They were and are—whatever they say—the descendants of Greeks (70%), Slav-Turks (20%) and various Frankish tribes [Frangikon filon] (10%). [Giorgiou 1993:196]."

Shih edhe

Helenocentrizmi

[1] Friedman, Victor A. (1997), "One Grammar, Three Lexicons: Ideological Overtones and Underpinnings in the Balkan Sprachbund Arkivuar 27 prill 2012 tek Wayback Machine", Papers from the 33rd Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (PDF), Chicago Linguistic Society. f. 33. "At first glance, the Greek practice of referring to Macedonian and Bulgarian speakers living in the Greek state as slavoophone Greeks, or to Albanian speakers as albanophone Greeks might appear to be a way of combining a recognition of linguistic difference with the old millet system of ethnic identification or possibly even the newer concept of nation-state citizenship (Greek thus meaning 'Greek Orthodox Christian' or, conceivably, 'Greek citizen'). That this is not actually the case, however, and that this policy is aimed at assimilating non-hellenophone minorities is seen in the fact that, aside from the history of oppressive government policies that have never allowed the use of the languages of non-hellenophone Christians in any public sphere and have, during some periods, even gone as far as to prohibit these languages in private, Greek governments never refer to the Greek-speaking minority of southern Albania as hellenophone Albanians or to Greek speakers in Turkey (regardless of religion) as hellenophone Turks."

[2] Beaton, R. (1996). The Medieval Greek Romance. Routledge. fq. 1–25. ISBN 0-415-12032-2. {{cite book}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)

[CIA-3] CIA World Factbook on Greece: Greek Orthodox 98%, Greek Muslim 1.3%, other 0.7%.

[Walbank13-4] Walbank, Frank W. (2010). Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography. Cambridge University Press. f. 1-3. "Can we speak of a Greek nation? Greece, as we all know, was never united until the Roman conquest within a single entity; consequently there can be no history of Greece in the sense that there is a history of Rome. But the concept of a Greek nation trying to realise itself (and failing) has been adopted by many historians as the most fruitful criterion for interpreting the kaleidoscopic relations of the Greek cities.... 'Particularism', we read, 'was the hereditary curse of the Greek people.' Athens, Sparta, Macedon, and the third-century Confederations, with their 'republican movement', were the successive incarnations of this spirit of national unity striving to be born. Each in turn proved abortive.... But the other supposedly great moment of Greek unification - the setting up of the League of Corinth by Philip II after Chaeronea - very soon became the centre of polemic. For in proportion as the stock of Philip and Isocrates rose, the reputation of Demosthenes fell, until he began to look like a petty and narrow patriot.... For the urge towards the autonomy of the polis was a force working against, and not in the direction of, Hellenic unity; and in an acute and pessimistic study Ferrabino demonstrated that this liberty, admitting no restraint, and developing whenever circumstances allowed into domination over others, was the one really potent factor in Greek history.... Panhellenism and the crusade against Persia.... had no more to do with a united Greek nation than had the anti-Macedonian coalition.... The conclusion seemed to be that the Greeks had a weak or ineffective national sense...."

[5] "Companion website for "A genetic atlas of human admixture history", Hellenthal et al, Science (2014)". A genetic atlas of human admixture history. {{cite web}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)
Hellenthal, Garrett; Busby, George B.J.; Band, Gavin; Wilson, James F.; Capelli, Cristian; Falush, Daniel; Myers, Simon (14 shkurt 2014). "A Genetic Atlas of Human Admixture History". Science. 343 (6172): 747–751. Bibcode:2014Sci...343..747H. doi:10.1126/science.1243518. ISSN 0036-8075. PMC 4209567. PMID 24531965. {{cite journal}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)
Hellenthal, G.; Busby, G. B.; Band, G.; Wilson, J. F.; Capelli, C.; Falush, D.; Myers, S. (2014). "Supplementary Material for "A genetic atlas of human admixture history"". Science. 343 (6172): 747–751. doi:10.1126/science.1243518. PMC 4209567. PMID 24531965. S7.6 "East Europe": The difference between the 'East Europe I' and 'East Europe II' analyses is that the latter analysis included the Polish as a potential donor population. The Polish were included in this analysis to reflect a Slavic language speaking source group." "We speculate that the second event seen in our six Eastern Europe populations between northern European and southern European ancestral sources may correspond to the expansion of Slavic language speaking groups (commonly referred to as the Slavic expansion) across this region at a similar time, perhaps related to displacement caused by the Eurasian steppe invaders (38; 58). Under this scenario, the northerly source in the second event might represent DNA from Slavic-speaking migrants (sampled Slavic-speaking groups are excluded from being donors in the EastEurope I analysis). To test consistency with this, we repainted these populations adding the Polish as a single Slavic-speaking donor group ("East Europe II" analysis; see Note S7.6) and, in doing so, they largely replaced the original North European component (Figure S21), although we note that two nearby populations, Belarus and Lithuania, are equally often inferred as sources in our original analysis (Table S12). Outside these six populations, an admixture event at the same time (910CE, 95% CI:720-1140CE) is seen in the southerly neighboring Greeks, between sources represented by multiple neighboring Mediterranean peoples (63%) and the Polish (37%), suggesting a strong and early impact of the Slavic expansions in Greece, a subject of recent debate (37). These shared signals we find across East European groups could explain a recent observation of an excess of IBD sharing among similar groups, including Greece, that was dated to a wide range between 1,000 and 2,000 years ago (37) {{cite journal}}: Mungon ose është bosh parametri |language= (Ndihmë!)

[Bintliff141142-6] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ Bintliff, John (2003). "The Ethnoarchaeology of a “Passive” Ethnicity: The Arvanites of Central Greece Arkivuar 8 mars 2019 tek Wayback Machine". në K.S. Brown & Yannis Hamilakis, (eds.). The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories. Lexington Books. f. 141-142. Yet we should not forget that, in the late sixth century AD, the whole of the area comprising modern Greece was overrun and colonized by Slays emanating from northeast Europe (Malingkoudis 1991). Central Greece, as most regions of the peninsula—the largest towns apart—was lost to the young Byzantine Empire, and it was only after recurrent campaigns in the late eighth century that Constantinople regained control over the mainland Greek countryside. What happened to the Slav settlers? Some nationalistic Greek historians, noting the disappearance of Slav Speakers and “Slav villages” in Byzantine historical sources for southern Greece by high medieval times, argue that the Slays died out, went home again, or at the very least were submerged definitively beneath the burgeoning Greek ethnic population. Many researchers today are converging on a very different story. The earlier Byzantine-era villages (ca. seventh to tenth centuries AD) that we know of seem to be frequently on or near former Greco-Roman small towns and villages, or large estate centers. Since we know that a major settlement of Slav incomers is included in this settlement picture, it seems most likely that the Slays settled places of earlier settlement and probably merged with surviving local farming populations of Greek descent to form mixed Helleno-Slav communities. The process was enhanced by the conversion of the Slavs to Orthodoxy throughout most of the Balkans and beyond, during this same period. Yet what happened to the language of these Slavs? Let us recall our comments earlier on Christian empires: the resurgent Byzantine, Orthodox, Greek- speaking empire, from the ninth century AD, privileged Greek language and culture, and, especially in the Greek peninsula, did not encourage local ethnicity to flourish. Thus the Helleno-Slavs became the merely “Orthodox and/or Greek” by the fifteenth-century Ottoman tax classification of ethnic groups in Greece."

[Bintliff133-7] Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 133. "The Greek-speakers would have called themselves, ironically, “Romioi” or “Romans” to signify the Byzantine claim to continuity with the Eastern Roman Empire—and hence were part of the communities called “Rum” by the Ottomans".

[KoliopoulosVeremis2223-8] Koliopoulos, John S. & Veremis, Thanos M. (2009). Modern Greece: A History since 1821. John Wiley & Sons. f. 22-23. "The Greeks of the time and subsequent decades renovated their nation on the premise that they were, in terms, of language and culture, the descendants of the ancient Greeks and that there has been a continuity of the Greek language and culture since antiquity in the historical Greek lands; which raised at the time and still raises many eyebrows in the West as well as in the East." f.23. "Indeed, this founding national myth has been successful in convincing the descendants of the non Greek-speaking groups, no less than Greek-speaking ones of the historical Greek lands, that their claim to cultural descent from the Greeks was not only irrefutable; it has proved a powerful adhesive force, which held the nation together, and has produced substantial cultural achievements in the space of less than two centuries."

[Blaschke201202-9] Blaschke, Jochen (2005). Nation-state Building Processes and Cultural Diversity. Edition Parabolis. f. 201-202. "As a result, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Greek national myth settled on a direct line of ancestry linking the contemporary Greek nation-state with the heroes of Greek mythology, classical antiquity, the Hellenistic period, the transformation of the Eastern Roman Empire to the Byzantine Empire and the period of oppression under the Ottoman Empire."

[TriandafyllidouGropas2829-10] Triandafyllidou, Anna & Gropas, Ruby (2015). What is Europe?^{[lidhje e vdekur]}. Macmillan International Higher Education. f. 28-29. "Reconsidering the meaning and uses of the term Europe in ancient times suggests that Europe was rather unimportant for the ancient Greeks, and for the Persians for that matter, and that if any sort of reference to Europe existed, it was centred much more to the east than it is today. Much of the connection between ancient Greece and Europe in modern times appears to be the work of modern ‘European’ intellectuals since the Enlightenment, when the link was reconstructed through references to ancient Greek civilization. As Tsoukalas also argues (2002) the Hellenism of modern Greece was largely imposed on it by Western Europeans while modern Greece had more to do with the Orient culturally and politically. The construction, however, of the link between ancient Greece and Europe has now served as a legitimizing myth for the Eurocentric interpretation of European civilization as unique and universal in the same way that ancient Greeks believed that their own culture and civilization was unique and superior to all others."

[Bintliff138a-11] Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 138. "Thus from the late nineteenth century onward the children of the inhabitants of the new “nation-state” were taught in Greek, history confined itself to the episodes of pure Greekness, and the tolerant Ottoman attitude to cultural diversity yielded to a deliberate policy of total Hellenization of the populace—effective enough to fool the casual observer. One is rather amazed at the persistence today of such dual-speaking populations in much of the Albanian colonization zone. However, apart from the provinciality of this essentially agricultural province, a high rate of illiteracy until well into this century has also helped to preserve Arvanitika in the Boeotian villagers (Meijs 1993)."

[Bintliff138b-12] Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 138. "In fact, recent scholarship has underlined how far it was the West that built modem Greece in its own fanciful image as the land of a long-oppressed people who were the direct descendants of Pericles. This Western creation of “the glorious continuing story of the Greek People” has been epitomized recently in the publication of multi-volume popular encyclopedias such as “The History of the Greek Nation” and marked even more recently by hysterical reactions to the supposed threat posed by the Slav Republic of Macedonia—not least merely by appropriating the name “Macedonia.” Being saddled with such a foundation charter from the early years of independence has forced the Greek education system and state propaganda to focus the survival of the struggling young nation onto what Benedict Anderson (1991) has termed the “imagined community” of Greeks."

[DragonasBirtek178179-13] Dragonas, Thalia & Birtek, Faruk (2004). Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey. Routledge. f. 178-179. "The national entity, defined through the alternative use of the terms 'Hellenism', 'the Greek people' or 'the Greeks' and 'Greece', is considered as given outside the context of history and of geography. The use of the term Hellenism helps the historical narrative to avoid obvious anachronisms and contradictions, while indirectly presenting the Greek nation as everlasting. This a-temporal and anthropomorphic subject is transcending both geography and history, since it is used to define the Greeks from the Minoan times all the way through to the eighteenth century. It thus serves as a basis for the valorization of events, acts and cultures over time."

[Bintliff137-14] Bintliff. The Arvanites of Central Greece. 2003. f. 137. "The Greek national education system stresses the heritage of classical Athens and the continuity of Greek virtues. History and archaeology for Greeks today usually all but stop at the Age of Alexander, and the former only picks up again with the War of Independence in the early nineteenth century. During the intervening two millennia of “oppression,” the Greek spirit slumbered in chains, with only Byzantine churches and icons to mark the eternal flame. The Albanian Greeks are a people without a formal history and no acknowledged place in the Modern Greek state."

[kathimeriniGreekviews-15] "Religion is key part of identity for most Greeks" (në anglisht). Kathimerini. Marrë më 2019-05-29. "More specifically, 76 percent of Greeks said that their nationality is defined by Christianity, behind Armenia (82 percent), Georgia (81 percent) and Serbia (78 percent).... A staggering 92 percent of Greek believe in the existence of God, ahead of the Russians (75 percent).... Greece and Latvia had the highest rate of those that believe in the “evil eye,” with each on 66 percent.... Another divide between East and West pertained to perception of cultural superiority over others, with Greece ranking first (89 percent), ahead of Armenia (84 percent) and Russia (69 percent).... Furthermore, only 31 percent Greeks would accept a Muslim as a member of their family while 35 percent would accept a Jew."

[Hart197-16] Hart, Laurie Kain (1999). "Culture, Civilization, and Demarcation at the Northwest Borders of Greece". American Ethnologist. 26. (1): 197. "The Albanian of Greek popular ideology is still a shadowy figure. When the Albanian national football team played a match against its Greek counterpart in Athens in 1990, the Athenian fans chanted: "You don't have a country [homeland]/You don't have a people/ What are you doing here/On this playing field?" [Dhen ekhete patridha/ Dhen ekhete lao/Ti irthate na kanete/Sto yipedho afto?]. The message is not hard to grasp. Having no place and no people, the Albanians cannot constitute a national team; if theirs is not a national team, it cannot have any place on the national playing field. Radical irredentist Greeks put the matter unambiguously: Stealing and plundering the cultural heritage of other peoples [Albanians] should understand that there is no question of their securing a uniform national-racial [ethnofiletiki] identity, because they have never constituted a national-racial unity. They were and are—whatever they say—the descendants of Greeks (70%), Slav-Turks (20%) and various Frankish tribes [Frangikon filon] (10%). [Giorgiou 1993:196]."

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